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Beyond Blue Chip: Issuer Standing to Seek Injunctive
Relief Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 Without
the Purchase or Sale of a Security
Eric C. Chaffee∗

I.

INTRODUCTION
1

In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, stated, “When we deal with private actions under
[section 10(b) and] Rule 10b-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has
2
grown from little more than a legislative acorn.” The Court in Blue
Chip described the state of the law:
No language in [section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5] speaks at all to the
contours of a private cause of action for their violation. . . . We are
dealing with a private cause of action which has been judicially
found to exist, and which will have to be judicially delimited one
3
way or another unless and until Congress addresses the question.
4

Put simply, because the private right of action under section 10(b)
5
and Rule 10b-5 is judicially implied, courts have wide discretion in
6
determining who has standing to sue under these provisions.
Standing to sue under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 can be determinative of whether an individual or entity has access to a wide

∗
Associate, Jones Day, Cleveland, Ohio. J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 2002;
B.A., Ohio State University, 1999. I would like to thank my family for their constant
support in all of my endeavors. I would also like to express my deepest gratitude to
Christine Gall for her critical comments and encouragement while I was drafting this
Article. The views set forth in this Article are completely my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of any employer or client either past or present.
1
421 U.S. 723 (1975).
2
Id. at 737.
3
Id. at 749.
4
15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000).
5
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005).
6
Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 749 (discussing the scope of the private right of action
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).

1135

CHAFFEE FINAL

1136

5/30/2006 8:39:33 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:1135

7

range of relief that these provisions can afford. Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 have provided relief in cases of corporate misstatements
and nondisclosures, insider trading, corporate mismanagement, improper mergers, dishonest corporate reorganizations, and a variety of
8
other circumstances involving securities fraud.
Although the private right of action under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 has grown far beyond the “legislative acorn,” the “judicial
oak” is far from fully developed. This area of law continues to be refined, and the Supreme Court has left open a number of large issues
regarding standing under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. For example, in Blue Chip, the Supreme Court held that standing to sue for
monetary damages is limited only to plaintiffs who have purchased or
sold securities in connection with an alleged manipulative or decep9
tive act. The Court, however, did not answer the question whether a
purchase or sale is required to confer standing to sue for injunctive
relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and if this standing exists,
whether a corporate issuer can take advantage of this standing.
Current case law suggests that a corporate issuer may have standing to seek injunctive relief without the purchase or sale of a secu10
rity. Strong policy justifications support the existence of such an exception to the purchaser-seller requirement under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5. The Supreme Court, however, has never ruled on
whether such an exception exists, and substantial obstacles stand in
the way of the Court allowing such an exception.
This Article explores whether a corporate issuer has standing to
seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the
purchase or sale of a security. The remainder of this Part contains
general statements regarding the timeliness of this topic. Part II provides background information regarding section 10(b) and Rule 10b5, the purchaser-seller rule, and the possible exceptions to this rule.
Part III examines the policy reasons for a corporate issuer having
standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
without a purchase or sale of a security, and Part IV discusses the obstacles that may impede a court from allowing a corporate issuer such
standing. Finally, Part V contains concluding remarks and suggests
7

THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.3[3] (5th ed.
2005) (discussing the wide variety of contexts in which section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
can provide relief).
8
Id.
9
421 U.S. at 753–55.
10
See infra note 151 (providing case law holding that a corporate issuer may have
standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the
purchase or sale of a security).
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that congressional action would be the best method to ensure issuer
standing.
This Article is timely because it analyzes a little-known method
for corporate issuers to protect themselves against stock manipulation, breaks fresh ground in legal scholarship, and discusses controversial issues that the Supreme Court will ultimately have to decide.
If a corporate issuer has standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, then the issuer has a sword to defend
against stock manipulation and to protect the value of its securities.
The purchase or sale of a security is viewed by many as an integral requirement for bringing an action under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5. This Article is significant because it discusses a lesser known
method for an issuer to defend against stock manipulation in cases in
which the issuer neither purchased nor sold securities in connection
with an alleged manipulative or deceptive act or omission.
This Article is also timely because it fills a unique void in current
scholarship. Nearly four decades have passed since a major academic
work has examined corporate issuer standing to bring an action for
11
injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The last major
examination of this topic occurred in a student comment that was
12
published during 1967 in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review.
In the time since that student comment, the Supreme Court an13
nounced its decision in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, which
is the seminal case examining standing under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5. Blue Chip definitively established that standing to sue for
monetary damages under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is available
only to plaintiffs who have purchased or sold securities in connection
14
Blue
with an alleged manipulative or deceptive act or omission.
Chip, however, debatably left open whether a purchase or sale is required to have standing to sue for injunctive relief under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and if this standing exists, whether an issuer
can take advantage of this standing.
This Article examines issues that the Supreme Court will have to
decide. Whether a corporate issuer has standing to pursue injunctive
relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 must be bifurcated into two

11

Comment, Private Enforcement Under Rule 10b-5: An Injunction for a Corporate Issuer?, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 618 (1967).
12
Id.
13
421 U.S. 723 (1975); see also Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461,
462 (2d Cir. 1952) (providing the rule that became the basis for the Blue Chip decision).
14
Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 753–55.
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related questions: First, does an individual or entity who does not
purchase or sell securities in connection with an allegedly manipulative or deceptive statement have standing to seek injunctive relief un15
der section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5? Second, if such standing does ex16
ist, does it extend to an issuer of stock? Courts have reached greatly
17
varied results in answering both of these questions. Unless Congress
acts first, the Supreme Court will have to resolve the state of the law
regarding standing under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. This Article
analyzes the considerations that the Court must address in adjudicating these issues.
II. BACKGROUND
The first step in analyzing whether a corporate issuer has standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without a purchase or sale requires putting the issue in context. In this
section, the history of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the purchaserseller requirement, and the possible exceptions to this requirement
will be examined.
A. The History of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
To understand the history of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, it is
necessary to review the advent of federal securities laws in the United
States, the basic structure of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and the
recognition of a private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5. The dawn of federal securities laws occurred in the 1930s. In
the shadow of the stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing depression, Congress enacted two major pieces of legislation designed
18
to govern the sale of securities. These two pieces of legislation, the
19
Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act
20
of 1934 (“1934 Act”), represent the first major federal attempts at
21
securities regulation.

15

See infra Part II.C (discussing the validity of the injunctive relief exception to
the purchaser-seller rule).
16
See infra Parts III, IV, V (analyzing issuer standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security).
17
See infra Parts II.C, III, IV.
18
See Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 727 (discussing the enactment of the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
19
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
20
Id. §§ 78a–77mm.
21
See Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 727–28.
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Congress created the 1933 Act with two primary purposes.
First, Congress sought to require that investors be provided with ma22
terial information regarding securities offered for public sale. Second, Congress sought to prevent misrepresentation, fraud, and deceit
23
in the sale of securities.
The 1933 Act has extensive provisions governing registrations
and prospectuses and provides express causes of action if these provi24
sions are violated. Section 11 of the 1933 Act provides a private
right of action for “any person acquiring a security” based on a registration “contain[ing] an untrue statement of a material fact or
omitt[ing] to state a material fact required to be stated therein or
25
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.” Section
26
12(a)(1) of the 1933 Act provides a private right of action for any
“person purchasing [a] security” against “any person who offers or
sells a security” in violation of the registration and prospectus re27
quirements found in section 5 of the 1933 Act. Additionally, section
12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act provides a private right of action for
any “person purchasing [a] security” against a person offering to
sell a security based on a prospectus or oral communication containing “an untrue statement of a material fact or omit[ting] to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements . . . not mis28
leading . . . .”
Congress created the 1934 Act for a variety of reasons relating to
29
the “national public interest.” These reasons include: the important
relationship between fair and honest markets and interstate commerce, the dangers of market manipulation, and the fear of national
30
emergencies created by unreasonable fluctuations in security prices.
The 1934 Act contains a variety of provisions dealing with the regula-

22

MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
1285 (8th ed. 2000) (discussing the public distribution of securities and the requirements of the 1933 Act).
23
Id.
24
See Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 728 (discussing the content of the 1933 Act).
25
15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000) (providing civil liabilities on account of false registration statements).
26
Id. § 77l(a)(1) (providing civil liabilities in connection with prospectuses and
communications).
27
Id. § 77e.
28
Id. § 77l(a)(2) (providing civil liabilities in connection with prospectuses and
communications).
29
Id. § 78b (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (providing the “necessity” for the regulation
contained within the 1934 Act).
30
Id.
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tion of securities, and section 4(a) of the 1934 Act established the Se31
curities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).
The 1934 Act also contains a number of express causes of action.
32
Section 9(e) of the 1934 Act provides a private right of action for
“any person who shall purchase or sell any security at a price” that was
affected by a variety of manipulative acts described in sections 9(a),
33
(b), and (c) of the 1934 Act. Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act provides
a private right of action for recovery of short-swing, insider profits “by
the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name
and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring
34
such suit . . . .” Additionally, section 18(a) of the 1934 Act provides
a private right of action to “any person . . . who . . . shall have purchased or sold a security” based on “false or misleading” statements
35
made in filings to the SEC.
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act makes it unlawful for any person
to “use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered, . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or con36
trivance . . . .” To enforce section 10(b), the SEC may promulgate
“such rules and regulations . . . as necessary or appropriate in the
37
public interest or for the protection of investors.”
In 1942, by
the authority granted in section 10(b), the SEC promulgated Rule
38
10b-5. Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or

31

15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (establishing and describing the

SEC).
32

Id. § 78i(e) (discussing persons liable in suits at law or in equity for manipulation of security prices).
33
Id.
34
Id. § 78p(b) (discussing civil liability for insider profits from the purchase and
sale, or sale and purchase, of a security within the same six month period).
35
Id. § 78r(a) (discussing liability for misleading statements made in SEC filings).
36
Id. § 78j.
37
15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000).
38
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005).
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(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

39

Section 21(e) of the 1934 Act expressly grants the SEC the power to
enforce section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and the other provisions of the
40
1934 Act. Section 27 of the 1934 Act grants federal courts jurisdic41
tion over cases relating to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Although no express private right of action is provided under
section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, courts have held that an implied private
42
right action does exist. In Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania became
the first court to recognize a private civil remedy under section 10(b)
43
and Rule 10b-5.
In Kardon, Morris and Eugene Kardon (collectively the “Kardons”) sued Leon and William Slavin (collectively the “Slavins”) and
National Gypsum Company (“National Gypsum”) for allegedly violat44
ing section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The Kardons and the Slavins both
owned stock in Western Board and Paper Company (“Western Board
and Paper”) and Michigan Stock and Paper Company (“Michigan
45
Stock and Paper”). The Slavins secretly entered a deal to sell Na46
tional Gypsum the assets of Western Board and Paper, and the Slavins then purchased the Kardons’ stock in both Western Board and
Paper and Michigan Stock and Paper without revealing the deal with
47
National Gypsum. The Kardons alleged that the Slavins and National Gypsum had violated section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by participating in a conspiracy to fraudulently misrepresent the truth to in48
duce the Kardons to sell their stock at an artificially low value. In
determining whether the Kardons had standing to seek relief under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the court relied on general tort law

39

Id.
15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
41
Id. § 78aa (2000).
42
69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
43
Id. at 514.
44
Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800–01 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (providing the factual background for the 1946 opinion establishing a private right of action
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
45
Id. at 800.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 801.
48
Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
40
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49

principals. Quoting section 286 of the Restatement of Torts, the
court wrote:
“The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited
act, or by failing to do a required act, makes the actor liable for an
invasion of an interest of another if; (a) the intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an interest of the other as
an individual; and (b) the interest invaded is one which the en50
actment is intended to protect.”

Because section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 had been enacted to protect
those who had been the victim of stock manipulation, the court held
51
that a private right of action does exist.
The Supreme Court did not address the existence of a private
right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 until a quarter of
52
53
a century later. After twenty-five years without comment, the Court
simply stated in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty
Co.: “It is now established that a private right of action is implied un54
der § 10(b).” The Court reached this holding because numerous
lower courts had reached this conclusion during the twenty-five years
55
between Kardon and Superintendent of Insurance.
B. Standing and the Purchaser-Seller Rule
After the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held that a private right of action exists under section

49

Id.
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1934)).
51
Id.
52
See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975) (noting
that the Court did not address the existence of a private right of action under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 until twenty-five years after Kardon); Superintendent of Ins. v.
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (providing the first discussion by
the Supreme Court of Kardon and a private right of action under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5).
53
In fact, the Supreme Court did not even first interpret section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 until 1969. See SEC v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969) (“Although
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 may well be the most litigated provisions in the federal securities laws, this is the first time this Court has found it necessary to interpret them.”).
54
Superintendent of Ins., 404 U.S. at 13 n.9 (citations omitted) (providing the Supreme Court’s one-line holding that a private right of action exists under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
55
See Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 730 (stating that by the time Superintendent of Insurance
was heard by the Court, “the overwhelming consensus of the District Courts and
Courts of Appeals [was] that such a cause of action did exist.”); but see infra Part IV.A
(suggesting that the Supreme Court probably would hold that no private right of action exists under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 if the issue reached the Court for the
first time today).
50
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56

10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a plethora of questions were created regarding who has standing to seek relief. In 1951, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit took a major step by answering
57
many of these questions in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp. Birnbaum
held that standing to sue under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is available only to plaintiffs who have purchased or sold securities in con58
nection with an alleged manipulative or deceptive act or omission.
Although the existence of exceptions is hotly debated and forms
the basis of this Article, the purchaser-seller rule that was announced
59
in Birnbaum remains in force today. In Birnbaum, a group of shareholders sued on behalf of Newport Steel Corporation (“Newport
Steel”) and other similarly situated shareholders for alleged violations
60
of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The shareholders alleged that the
president and various members the Newport Steel board of directors
defrauded the shareholders by permitting the president to sell his
forty percent of stock in Newport Steel for a large profit after rejecting a tender offer that would have been profitable to all of the share61
holders.
The president and various other defendants moved to
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because the shareholders and corporation
62
did not purchase stock based on the alleged misrepresentation. The
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
63
agreed and dismissed the action.
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court and
held that to have standing, a plaintiff must have purchased or sold securities in connection with an alleged manipulative or deceptive act
64
or omission. The court made its decision by interpreting section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in the context of the 1933 Act and the 1934
65
Act. The court determined that the SEC had promulgated Rule
10b-5 to protect “against fraud on a seller of securities by the pur-

56

Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
58
Id. at 463.
59
See infra Part II.C (discussing possible exceptions to the purchaser-seller rule).
60
Birnbaum, 193 F.2d at 462.
61
Id. at 462–63.
62
Id. at 462.
63
Id. at 463. The distinguished panel deciding Birnbaum consisted of Chief
Judge Swan, Judge Learned Hand, and Judge Augustus Hand. Id. at 462. Judge Augustus Hand wrote the opinion of the court. Id.
64
Birnbaum, 193 F.2d at 463.
65
Id. at 463–64.
57
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chaser if the latter was not a broker or a dealer.” Prior to the enactment of Rule 10b-5, section 17(a) of the 1933 Act and section
15(c) of the 1934 Act represented the only prohibitions against fraud
67
under federal securities law. Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act makes it
unlawful to use fraudulent methods against a purchaser in the sale or
68
offer of any security, and section 15(c) of the 1934 Act deals only
with fraudulent practices by brokers and dealers in over-the-counter
69
markets. In short, the court viewed Rule 10b-5 as a gap filler to pro70
tect sellers of securities who are not brokers or dealers. The court
bolstered its holding by citing an SEC press release stating that Rule
10b-5 was created to “‘prohibit[] individuals or companies from buy71
ing securities if they engage in fraud in their purchase.’” Because
Rule 10b-5 was designed to protect sellers of securities, the Second
Circuit held that standing under Rule 10b-5 requires the plaintiff to
have purchased or sold securities in connection with an alleged ma72
nipulative or deceptive act or omission.
Notably, the court in Birnbaum rejected the argument that applying the purchaser-seller rule under Rule 10b-5 would render the
words “in connection with” superfluous. The court held that when
read in the context of the 1933 Act and 1934 Act, the meaning of

66

Id. at 463.
Id.
68
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2000).
69
Id. § 78o(c).
70
Birnbaum, 193 F.2d at 463.
71
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230
(May 21, 1942), regarding the enactment of Rule 10b-5). Ironically, in the late 1960s
and early 1970s, the SEC filed numerous amicus curiae briefs expressing its opposition to the purchaser-seller rule. See, e.g., Mount Clemens Indus. Inc. v. Bell, 464
F.2d 339, 341 (9th Cir. 1972) (stating that the SEC in an amicus curiae brief had
taken the position that Birnbaum was incorrectly decided); Drachman v. Harvey, 453
F.2d 722, 738 (2d Cir. 1972) (“The Commission urges us to take this opportunity to
review and repudiate the purchaser-seller requirement for 10b-5 actions which we
enunciated in Birnbaum . . . .”); Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328, 329 (2d Cir.
1971) (stating that the SEC has suggested that the Second Circuit should overrule
the purchaser-seller requirement); Iroquois Indus. Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417
F.2d 963, 967 (2d Cir. 1969) (noting that the SEC has asked the Second Circuit to
overrule Birnbaum and has asserted that Birnbaum has been weakened by a number of
subsequent opinions). Prior to Blue Chip, the SEC also sought on two separate occasions, without success, to amend section 10(b) from “‘in connection with the purchase or sale of any security’” to “‘in connection with the purchase or sale of, or any
attempt to purchase or sell, any security.’” Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 732 (1975).
72
Birnbaum, 193 F.2d at 463.
67
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Rule 10b-5 was “not difficult to ascertain,” even though the rule was
73
“somewhat loosely drawn [in] its meaning.”
The Supreme Court waited over twenty years to address the rule
74
announced in Birnbaum. In the interim, numerous reported cases
reaffirmed Birnbaum’s holding that a plaintiff must have purchased or
sold securities in connection with an alleged manipulative or deceptive act or omission to have standing to sue under section 10(b) and
75
Rule 10b-5. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, the Supreme
Court adopted the purchaser-seller rule that was announced in Birn76
baum. Justice Blackmun, writing in dissent, went so far as to say that
77
Birnbaum is regarded as the “Mother Court” in this area of the law.
In Blue Chip, a company, Blue Chip Stamps, had been required
to offer shares of its stock to a group of retailers as part of an antitrust
78
consent decree. One of the retailers who did not purchase stock
later sued Blue Chip Stamps on the grounds that Blue Chip Stamps
allegedly issued an overly pessimistic appraisal of its status and future
79
prospects to dissuade potential purchasers. The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the complaint on the ground that the retailer had not purchased or sold
80
stock based on the alleged deception. A divided panel of the Ninth
Circuit reversed the district court after reasoning that an exception to
the purchaser-seller requirement was warranted under the circum81
stances.
73

Id.
See Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 731 (explaining that it took the Supreme Court over
twenty years to address the purchaser-seller rule that was announced in Birnbaum).
The Supreme Court declined the opportunity to rule on the purchaser-seller standing requirement in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S.
6, 13 n.10 (1971). In fact, the Court had the opportunity to rule on the purchaserseller standing requirement when it interpreted section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for the
first time in 1969, but the Court opted to “enter . . . virgin territory cautiously.” SEC
v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969) (providing the Court’s first attempt at interpreting section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
75
Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 731–32 (“[V]irtually all lower federal courts facing the issue in the hundreds of reported cases presenting this question over the past quarter
century have reaffirmed Birnbaum’s conclusion that the plaintiff class for purposes of
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 private damage actions is limited to purchasers and sellers of
securities.”); but see infra Part II.C (outlining various exceptions that developed in the
interim between Birnbaum and the Supreme Court’s adoption of the purchaser-seller
rule in Blue Chip).
76
Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 731.
77
Id. at 762 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
78
Id. at 726 (majority opinion).
79
Id.
80
Id. at 727.
81
Id. at 731.
74
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On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court
and held that the retailer had no standing to seek relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because the retailer had not purchased or
82
sold based on the alleged deception. The Court based its holding
83
largely on policy considerations because, as Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, put it, “neither the congressional enactment nor
84
the administrative regulations offer conclusive guidance.”
The
Court’s decision to grant standing to sue for damages only to plaintiffs who purchased or sold based on allegedly misleading statements
turned heavily on the Court’s fear that vexatious litigation would in85
crease dramatically without this requirement. The Court was concerned that strike suits by plaintiffs seeking unjust enrichment would
86
become commonplace without this requirement. Also, the Court
was concerned that without this rule, courts would become the adjudicators of numerous “hazy issues of historical fact the proof of which
87
depended almost entirely on oral testimony.”
C. Exceptions to the Purchaser-Seller Rule
88

Even though Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores established
that standing to sue for monetary damages under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 is limited only to plaintiffs who have purchased or sold securities, the Supreme Court left open the question of whether various
exceptions to the purchaser-seller rule exist. This section examines a
number of exceptions that developed between Birnbaum v. Newport
89
Steel Corp. and Blue Chip.
The Second Circuit announced the purchaser-seller rule in
1952, and the Supreme Court did not endorse this holding until
90
1975. Before the Supreme Court’s adoption of the Birnbaum rule in

82

Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 727, 753–55.
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, Marshall, and Powell joined
the opinion of the Court, delivered by Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 725. Justice Powell
filed a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall. Id. at
755 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion, which was
joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan. Id. at 761 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
84
Id. at 737 (majority opinion).
85
Id. at 737–49.
86
Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 741–43.
87
Id. at 743.
88
Id. at 753–55.
89
193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
90
See supra note 74 and accompanying text (noting that it took the Supreme
Court over twenty years to endorse the purchaser-seller rule).
83
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Blue Chip, the purchaser-seller rule had begun to significantly erode.
In the interim between these two opinions, at least four exceptions to
92
the purchaser-seller rule developed. In fact, prior to Blue Chip, these
93
94
exceptions lead some courts and commentators to question
whether the purchaser-seller rule announced in Birnbaum had been
95
rejected.
The four major exceptions that developed in the interim between Birnbaum and Blue Chip are the aborted transaction exception,
the forced seller exception, the de facto purchaser-seller exception,
96
and the injunctive relief exception. Blue Chip debatably left open
97
whether three of these exceptions still exist. The four possible exceptions to the purchaser-seller rule are examined below.
91

See Bound Brook Water Co. v. Jaffe, 284 F. Supp. 702, 708 (D.N.J. 1968) (“One
noticeable trend [was] the expansion of the concepts of purchaser and seller. Another trend [was] the expansion of standing to sue on the part of non-sellers and
non-purchasers where the allegedly wrongful activity [was] attributable to the controlling faction in the corporation, and the result of that activity works to the detriment of the corporation and the minority stockholders.”).
92
See Comment, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores: Failure to Solve the Purchaser-Seller Problem, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 965, 985–93 (1976) (discussing the various exceptions to the Birnbaum rule).
93
See, e.g., Eason v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654, 659 (7th Cir.
1973) (rejecting the purchaser-seller rule based in part because “[t]he course of judicial decision since 1952, when Birnbaum was decided, has actually recognized that
the class of protected persons is broader than merely purchasers and sellers.”);
Young v. Seaboard Corp., 360 F. Supp. 490, 494 (D. Utah 1973) (rejecting the purchaser-seller rule in favor of a rule that “[a]ctions under rule 10b-5 must be founded
in fraud touching a securities transaction and must exhibit a direct and causal relationship between that fraud and the claimed injury”); Tully v. Mott Supermarkets,
Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834, 839 (D.N.J. 1972) (“The thrust of defendants’ jurisdictional
argument seeks to revive the spectre of the Birnbaum buyer-seller doctrine at a point
in time when both courts and legal scholars are seeking to bury it.”); Entel v. Allen,
270 F. Supp. 60, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (stating that the Second Circuit cases after Birnbaum “seriously challenge[d], if not overrule[d]” the purchaser-seller requirement).
94
See, e.g., Michael M. Boone & Patrick F. McGowan, Standing to Sue Under SEC
Rule 10b-5, 49 TEX. L. REV. 617, 620 (1971) (“[R]ecent judicial interpretation has
raised doubts about the present meaning and vitality of the [purchaser-seller] rule.”
(footnote omitted)); Lewis D. Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New
Era for Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. L. REV. 268, 275–77 (1968) (discussing the “demise” of the
purchaser-seller rule); see also Note, Standing Under Rule 10b-5 After Blue Chip Stamps,
75 MICH. L. REV. 413, 414 (1976) (“The repeated modification, circumvention, and
outright rejection of the Birnbaum rule by the lower courts clearly undermined its
force and appeared to portend its demise .”).
95
But see, e.g., Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 877 (5th Cir. 1970) (“Bloody but
unbowed, Birnbaum still stands.”).
96
See Comment, supra note 92, at 985–93.
97
Blue Chip did confirm that one means of circumventing the purchaser-seller
rule does exist by way of derivative suits in which a shareholder brings an action on
behalf of a corporation that has purchased or sold a security in connection with an
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The first exception to the purchaser-seller rule that developed in
the interim between Birnbaum and Blue Chip is the aborted transaction exception. In a small number of cases, courts were willing to circumvent the purchaser-seller rule when an alleged violation of sec98
99
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 prevented or delayed the consummation
of a purchase or sale of securities.
The Supreme Court rejected the aborted transaction exception
100
in Blue Chip.
As explained previously, a company, Blue Chip
alleged manipulative or deceptive act or omission. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 738 (1975) (“It has been held that [a] shareholder . . .
may . . . circumvent the [purchaser-seller rule] through bringing a derivative action
on behalf of the corporate issuer if the latter is itself a purchaser or seller of securities.”). This is not an exception to the purchaser-seller rule because the standing
imbues to the corporation itself, rather than a shareholder who did not purchase or
sell in connection with the alleged deception. See David W. Lamb, Recent Developments, Securities Fraud—Standing to Sue in 10b-5 Actions Requesting Injunctive Relief—
Requirement that Plaintiff be Purchaser or Seller, 52 TENN. L. REV. 755, 758–59 n.22 (1985)
(noting that standing to sue on behalf of the corporation that purchased or sold securities in connection with an alleged deception is not an exception to the purchaser-seller rule); see also Rathborne v. Rathborne, 683 F.2d 914, 919 n.16 (5th Cir.
1982) (“If a corporation has purchased or sold securities in a transaction tainted by
fraud, the corporation may have a 10b-5 cause of action. However, the corporation’s
shareholders do not have standing to directly assert a claim which ‘belongs to’ the
corporation.”).
98
See, e.g., Neuman v. Elec. Specialty Co., No. 68-C-1817, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13005, at *11–12 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 31, 1969) (finding standing under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 because the alleged deceptions prevented the plaintiffs from selling their
shares during a tender offer); Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc., 290 F. Supp.
715, 718–19 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding that standing under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 can be based on circumstances in which the defendant’s alleged fraud prevents
a purchase or a sale); but see Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 593 (5th
Cir. 1974) (holding that courts have “consistently” denied standing under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to stockholders who have allegedly been fraudulently induced
to not sell their stock).
99
Silverman v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 331 F. Supp. 1334, 1336 (E.D. Pa. 1971)
(holding that a plaintiff had standing under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to pursue
a claim against a broker who allegedly delayed in selling the securities of the plaintiff’s partnership); Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)
(“If plaintiffs indeed wished to sell their . . . shares and were induced to defer the
sale by the fraudulent representations of the defendants, with the result that they ultimately sold at a greater loss, it follows . . . that the fraud was in connection with the
sale of securities as that term is used in Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”).
100
421 U.S. at 749–55; see also Gurley v. Documation, Inc., 674 F.2d 253, 255–56
(4th Cir. 1982) (holding that in the wake of Blue Chip, courts have uniformly denied
standing under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 based on alleged fraudulent inducement to retain securities); O’Brien v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago,
593 F.2d 54, 58 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding based on Blue Chip that the purchaser-seller
requirement does not allow remedy to individuals who allege that they did not sell
securities because of some fraudulent misrepresentation); Sacks v. Reynolds Sec.,
Inc., 593 F.2d 1234, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“Blue Chip Stamps does not permit recovery under Rule 10b-5 when alleged fraud causes an investor to retain ownership of
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Stamps, had been required to offer shares of its stock to a group of
101
retailers as part of an antitrust consent decree. One of the retailers
alleged that it had failed to purchase shares because Blue Chip
Stamps issued an overly pessimistic appraisal of its status and future
102
prospects to dissuade potential purchasers.
After reaffirming the
purchaser-seller rule announced in Birnbaum, the Supreme Court refused to make an exception to the purchaser-seller rule based on the
alleged pessimistic appraisal that had prevented the retailer from
103
purchasing stock in Blue Chip Stamps.
In short, the Court held
that the retailer’s aborted transaction by no means gave it standing to
104
pursue an action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
The Court did note that the outcome would have been different
if the retailer had possessed a contractual right to purchase or sell se105
curities. This, however, should not be viewed as a validation of the
aborted transaction exception. Under section 3(a) of the 1934 Act,
the terms “purchase” and “sale” are defined to include contractual
106
rights to purchase and sell. Thus, a person or entity who has a contractual right to buy or sell securities and fails to do so based on an alleged deception can still have standing to sue under section 10(b)

securities.”); Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 868 (2d Cir. 1977) (denying
standing based on Blue Chip because the plaintiffs alleged that they were fraudulently
induced not to sell their securities); Williams v. Sinclair, 529 F.2d 1383, 1389 (9th
Cir. 1975) (denying standing under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to a group of individuals who retained their securities after an alleged deception).
101
Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 726.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 749–55.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 749 (“[P]rior cases have held that persons owning contractual rights to
buy or sell securities are not excluded by the Birnbaum rule.”); see, e.g., Walling v.
Beverly Enters., 476 F.2d 393, 395–97 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that alleged fraudulent failure to perform under a contract to sell securities provides a basis for standing
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5); Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d
339, 345–46 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding that a contractual right to purchase or sell securities qualifies a plaintiff as a statutory purchaser for purposes of determining
standing under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5); A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d
393, 395–97 (2d Cir 1967) (holding that a stockbroker had standing to bring suit
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for defendants’ alleged fraudulent failure to pay
for securities that they had entered into an agreement to purchase through the broker); Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 367 F.2d 157, 158 (2d Cir. 1966) (permitting a
suit under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for failure to carry out a contract for the sale
of stock).
106
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (“The terms ‘buy’ and ‘purchase’ each include any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire.”); 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(14) (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (“The terms ‘sale’ and ‘sell’ each include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of.”).
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and Rule 10b-5 without requiring an exception to the purchaser107
seller rule.
The second exception that developed between Birnbaum and
Blue Chip is the forced seller exception. Under the forced seller exception, an individual or entity has standing under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 if the individual or entity sues when left with no option
108
other than to sell or convert a security.
109
For example, in Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., the Second Circuit held that a shareholder had standing to maintain an action under the forced seller exception to the purchaser-seller rule even
110
though an actual sale had not yet taken place.
The shareholder
sued because an allegedly fraudulent short form merger had left the
shareholder with no other option than to sell his stock for an inade111
quate price or retain stock in a corporation that no longer existed.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York dismissed the claim under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for lack
of standing on the grounds that the shareholder had not purchased
or sold in connection with an alleged manipulative or deceptive act
112
or omission. The Second Circuit reversed and held that the shareholder was a “seller” for purposes of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because the actual sale of the shares was a “needless formality” when the
113
shareholder was left with no other option but to sell.
The Supreme Court has never spoken on whether the forced
seller exception survived the adoption of the Birnbaum rule in Blue
107

See Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 749–55.
See, e.g., Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 522–23 (8th Cir. 1973)
(granting stockholders who did not sell their stock standing to sue under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as “forced sellers” because an open market for their stock had
ceased to exist and the only possibility for sale of the stock was to the defendants on
the defendants’ terms); Dudley v. Se. Factor & Fin. Corp., 446 F.2d 303, 308 (5th Cir.
1971) (holding that standing exists under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when an “investment in a going enterprise has been commuted into a right . . . to a payment of
money”); Coffee v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d 383, 386 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding that a
shareholder will have standing under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without a purchase or a sale if the shareholder “has no choice but to surrender his interest in the
corporation and to exchange his shares for cash”); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air
Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 798 (2d Cir. 1969) (holding that standing to sue exists under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when one becomes a “forced seller” based on an alleged deception); see generally Richard B. Gallagher, Annotation, Who is “Forced Seller”
for Purposes of Maintenance of Civil Action Under § 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(15 USCS § 78j(b)) and SEC Rule 10b-5, 59 A.L.R. FED. 10 (1982).
109
374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967).
110
Id. at 633–35.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 633.
113
Id. at 634.
108
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Chip. A number of courts have reaffirmed this exception since Blue
114
Chip, and held that the forced seller exception to the purchaser115
seller requirement is still valid law.
A third exception that developed in the time between Birnbaum
and Blue Chip is the de facto purchaser-seller exception. Under this
exception, an individual or entity with only a beneficial interest in a
security will have standing to sue under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
if the security is purchased or sold in connection with an alleged ma116
nipulative or deceptive act or omission.
117
For example, in James v. Gerber Products Co., the Sixth Circuit
held that an individual who benefits from a sale of a security is a de
facto seller and has standing to pursue an action under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5. In that case, the beneficiary of two testamentary
trusts alleged that the trustee had committed a violation of section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by selling stock from the trusts at less than fair
118
market value to Gerber Products Company. The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan dismissed the case
because the beneficiary had neither purchased nor sold the stock
119
herself.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the beneficiary did have standing to sue because she was a de facto seller of the
114

8 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3741 (3d ed. 2004)
(discussing the current state of the law relating to the forced seller exception).
115
See, e.g., 7547 Corp. v. Parker & Parsley Dev. Partners, L.P., 38 F.3d 211, 228
(5th Cir. 1994) (“[W]e do not believe that the teachings of Blue Chip Stamps would
preclude standing as section 10(b) ‘forced sellers’ to investors of merged companies
who can show a substantial change in the nature of their investments.”); Mayer v. Oil
Field Sys. Corp., 721 F.2d 59, 65–68 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that the forced seller exception survived Blue Chip); Alley v. Miramon, 614 F.2d 1372, 1385–87 (5th Cir.
1980) (reaffirming the forced seller exception and holding that it does not undermine the policy objective of Blue Chip); see also Jacobson v. AEG Capital Corp., 50
F.3d 1493, 1499 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he forced sale doctrine does not cut a wide
swath. Although recognized by the Ninth Circuit, we have rarely encountered instances where it applies.”); but see Isquith v. Caremark Int’l, Inc., 136 F.3d 531, 535–
36 (7th Cir. 1998) (questioning the continued existence of the forced seller exception).
116
See, e.g., Heyman v. Heyman, 356 F. Supp. 958, 964–66 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (holding that a trust beneficiary had standing to seek relief under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security because the beneficiary had been a
de facto seller of the securities in the trust); but see Rippey v. Denver U.S. Nat’l Bank,
260 F. Supp. 704, 715–16 (D. Colo. 1966) (holding that trust beneficiaries could not
maintain an action against a trustee because having a beneficial interest in the securities at issue did not allow them to be purchasers or sellers for purposes of section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
117
483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973).
118
Id. at 945.
119
Id. at 946.
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120

securities. The court reached its holding because conferring standing to the beneficiary was consistent with the interests served by section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to protect investors “from those who deal
121
unfairly with them.” The court stated that “novel or atypical transactions [were] not to be excluded from” the ambit of section 10(b)
122
and Rule 10b-5.
It is unclear whether the de facto purchaser-seller exception was
overruled by Blue Chip. If Blue Chip provides a bright line rule, then
the de facto purchaser-seller exception is likely invalid because de
facto purchasers or sellers are not actual purchasers or sellers. A
number of lower courts, however, have reaffirmed the de facto pur123
chaser-seller exception since Blue Chip.
The validity of this exception will ultimately have to be addressed by the Supreme Court,
unless Congress acts first.
The fourth exception to the purchaser-seller rule involves actions for injunctive relief to prevent prospective fraudulent con124
duct. In the interim between Birnbaum and Blue Chip, a number of
120

Id. at 948–50.
Id. at 948.
122
Id. at 949.
123
See, e.g., Grubb v. FDIC, 868 F.2d 1151, 1161–62 (10th Cir. 1989) (finding
standing to sue under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a
security for a plaintiff who guaranteed a loan that was used by a holding company to
purchase stock because the plaintiff was the actual party at risk); Norris v. Wirtz, 719
F.2d 256, 259–61 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that a trust beneficiary that sold securities
had standing to bring an action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations had been made directly to the beneficiary who
had the right to approve the sale and had experienced the direct impact of the alleged fraud); Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234, 240–41 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding
that a trust beneficiary may sue a trustee under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for
frauds committed by a trustee); Hackford v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A., 521 F.
Supp. 541, 549 (D. Utah 1981) (holding that trust beneficiaries have standing to
bring actions under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because the beneficiaries feel the
impact of any fraud, rather than the trustee). Some courts, however, have declined
to grant standing to trust beneficiaries when total investment authority has been
delegated to a trustee. See Congregation of the Passion, Holy Cross Province v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 800 F.2d 177, 181 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that the court could
not imply a violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when the plaintiff had transferred full authority to make investment decisions to the defendant); O’Brien v.
Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 593 F.2d 54, 59–63 (7th Cir. 1979)
(holding that a trust beneficiary does not have standing under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 to sue a trustee who has total discretionary power to purchase and sell securities because an alleged misrepresentation could not be “in connection with” the
purchase or sale of a security).
124
Courts have held that this exception does not apply when the fraud sought to
be enjoined has already been completed. See, e.g., Doll v. James Martin Assocs.
(Holdings), Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 510, 522 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (holding that the injunctive relief exception applies “only when plaintiff seeks ‘prophylactic relief’, i.e. a pro121
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courts held that the purchaser-seller rule applied only to actions for
125
Blue
monetary damages, rather than actions for injunctive relief.
Chip left open whether the injunctive relief exception to the purchaser-seller rule still exists.
After Blue Chip, the circuit courts split on whether an individual
or entity can have standing under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to
126
seek injunctive relief without the purchase or sale of a security. A
number of courts have reached the conclusion that actions for in-

hibition against future violation of the securities laws”); Bertozzi v. King Louie Int’l,
Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1166, 1177 (D.R.I. 1976) (holding that the injunctive relief exception to the purchaser-seller requirement applies only “to prevent consummation of
[the] resultant injury from an asserted § 10(b)/10b-5 violation”); Petersen v. Federated Dev. Co., 387 F. Supp 355, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (“Although a stockholder has
been permitted to seek injunctive relief against threatened or continuing fraud, he
lacks standing to seek injunctive relief once the fraud has been consummated.” (citation omitted)); Heyman v. Heyman, 356 F. Supp. 958, 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (holding
that the injunctive relief exception to the purchaser-seller rule does not apply in
situations in which the alleged fraudulent exchange has been fully completed); see
also infra note 186 (citing case law holding that a corporate issuer will only have
standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 if the issuer can
demonstrate that the continuation of the alleged deception will cause some injury to
the issuer).
125
See, e.g., Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 156 (3d Cir. 1973) (“An injunction suit,
as distinguished from an action for damages, will therefore, in appropriate circumstances, be permitted under [section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5] even though the complainant is not a purchaser or seller.”); Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 173 (3d
Cir. 1970) (holding that an individual or entity does not have to purchase or sell securities to have standing to bring an action for injunctive relief under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5); Britt v. Cyril Bath Co., 417 F.2d 433, 435–36 (6th Cir. 1969) (allowing an action for injunctive relief based on section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to proceed
despite the fact that the plaintiff neither purchased nor sold stock based on the alleged deception); Mut. Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 546–47 (2d Cir.
1967) (holding that plaintiffs had standing to pursue injunctive relief under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without a purchase or sale of securities); Moore v.
Greatamerica Corp., 274 F. Supp. 490, 492 (N.D. Ohio 1967) (holding that a corporate issuer had standing to sue for injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security); but see Greater Iowa Corp. v.
McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, 791–92 (8th Cir. 1967) (applying the purchaser-seller rule
to deny standing in an action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for injunctive relief and not commenting regarding possible differing treatment for standing in actions for injunctive relief, rather than actions for monetary damages).
126
See HAZEN, supra note 7, § 12.7[2] (“There is authority to the effect that a person need be neither a purchaser nor a seller of securities in order to maintain an action for injunctive relief under Rule 10b-5. There is also some authority to the contrary.” (footnotes omitted)); Liberty Nat’l Ins. Holding Co. v. Charter Co., 734 F.2d
545, 557 n.27 (11th Cir. 1984) (“[C]ourts addressing the question of whether a cause
of action exists for a non-purchaser-seller have come down on each side of the issue.”). Even prior to Blue Chip, the circuit courts were divided on the existence of an
injunctive relief exception. See supra note 125.
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junctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are not subject to
127
the purchaser-seller requirement.
The Second Circuit, for example, has recognized that a plaintiff
does not need to be a purchaser or seller to have standing to sue for
128
injunctive relief. The Southern District of New York has even stated
that standing to sue for injunctive relief is “well-established” Second
129
Circuit precedent.
The Second Circuit first recognized the injunctive relief exception to the purchaser-seller requirement in 1967. In Mutual Shares
130
Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., the Second Circuit held that an entity can have
standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
without the purchase or sale of a security. In that case, various shareholders of S.H. Kress and Company (“Kress”) sued Genesco, Inc.
(“Genesco”) for damages and injunctive relief under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 based on an alleged “fraudulent conspiracy” to gain
131
control of Kress. The United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York dismissed the claim based on lack of federal
question jurisdiction for failing to state a claim under section 10(b)
132
and Rule 10b-5.
The Second Circuit reversed in part and held that the shareholders could pursue the claim for injunctive relief under section
133
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without a purchase or sale of a security.
In
reaching this conclusion, the court noted that although the SEC
could bring an action to halt any fraudulent practices, shareholders
could play a significant role in enforcement of section 10(b) and
127

See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 526 F.2d 1286, 1290 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that the
purchaser-seller requirement does not apply to actions for injunctive relief); Granada
Invs., Inc. v. DWG Corp., 717 F. Supp. 533, 535 (N.D. Ohio 1989) (holding that “suits
for prospective injunctive relief pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act may
be brought by plaintiffs who are not actual purchasers or sellers”); USG Corp. v.
Wagner & Brown, 689 F. Supp. 1483, 1493–94 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that a corporate issuer and a shareholder had standing to seek injunctive relief under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because of the injunctive relief exception to the purchaserseller rule); Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Res. Ltd., 574 F. Supp. 1172, 1198
(N.D. Ohio 1982) (holding that an issuer could maintain an action for injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security);
Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349, 1358–59 (N.D. Tex.
1979) (holding that the purchaser-seller rule announced in Blue Chip does not apply
to actions for injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
128
See infra note 138.
129
Langner v. Brown, 913 F. Supp. 260, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
130
384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
131
Id. at 542.
132
Id. at 543.
133
Id. at 546–47.
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Rule 10b-5 by allowing standing to seek injunctive relief without the
134
The court opted to treat injunctive
purchase or sale of a security.
relief differently from damages because injunctive relief does not suffer from the same issues regarding “proof of loss and the causal con135
nection with the alleged violation of the Rule.”
The court also
noted that injunctive relief helps to prophylactically prevent harm to
136
continuing shareholders.
The Second Circuit’s adoption of the injunctive relief exception
137
is noteworthy because the Second Circuit was the “Mother Court”
for the purchaser-seller rule. Mutual Shares is just one in a long line
138
of Second Circuit opinions applying this exception.
All courts, however, have not adopted the injunctive relief exception to the purchaser-seller rule that was announced in Blue Chip.
139
Some courts have yet to take a definitive position on the issue, and

134

Id. at 547.
Id.
136
Mut. Shares, 384 F.2d at 547.
137
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (discussing the importance of Birnbaum).
138
See, e.g., Simon DeBartolo Group, L.P. v. Richard E. Jacobs Group, Inc., 186
F.3d 157, 170–71 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the purchaser-seller requirement does
not apply in actions for injunctive relief); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17
(2d Cir. 1981) (“[T]his Court, and other Courts of Appeals as well, [have] held that a
plaintiff need not be a defrauded purchaser or seller in order to sue for injunctive
relief under Rule 10b-5.”); Langner v. Brown, 913 F. Supp. 260, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(holding that the injunctive relief exception to the purchaser-seller requirement is
“well-established” in the Second Circuit); Packer v. Yampol, 630 F. Supp. 1237, 1241–
42 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (recognizing that plaintiffs who are seeking injunctive relief,
rather than damages, need not satisfy the purchaser-seller requirement); Fuchs v.
Swanton Corp., 482 F. Supp. 83, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (“It has long been held in this
Circuit that a suit for injunctive relief under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act may
be maintained by plaintiffs who are not actual purchasers or sellers of securities in
connection with the challenged transactions.”); Monheit v. Carter, 376 F. Supp. 334,
342 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (holding that a plaintiff does not need to be a purchaser or a
seller of securities to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
139
See, e.g., Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts Inc., 140 F.3d
478, 486 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that the Third Circuit has not addressed whether the
injunctive relief exception survived Blue Chip and opting to make that decision at
some later time); but see Foster Wheeler Corp. v. Edelman, No. 87-4346 (GEB), 1987
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16783, at *9–12 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 1987) (holding that an exception to
the Blue Chip rule exists for injunctive relief until the Third Circuit states otherwise);
see also, e.g., Advanced Res. Int’l, Inc. v. Tri-Star Petroleum Co., 4 F.3d 327, 332 (4th
Cir. 1993) (declining to decide whether the injunctive relief exception exists but
placing restrictions on any exception to the purchaser-seller standing requirement
that might exist); Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Bader & Dufty, 627 F.2d 221, 223
(10th Cir. 1980) (reserving for future determination whether the purchaser-seller
rule that was announced in Blue Chip applies to actions in which only injunctive relief
is sought).
135
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a number of courts have even held that no exception exists for plain140
tiffs seeking injunctive relief.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, for example, has concluded that the injunctive relief exception did not survive the Supreme Court’s holding in Blue Chip. In
141
Cowin v. Bresler, the D.C. Circuit held that the purchaser-seller rule
is applicable regardless of whether a plaintiff seeks monetary damages or injunctive relief. In that case, a minority shareholder of
Bresler & Reiner, Inc. alleged that the majority shareholders had violated section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by issuing deceptive reports to the
shareholders and concealing material information regarding the
142
corporation. The minority shareholder did not assert that he purchased or sold based on the alleged deception, but he claimed that
his stock was made less valuable based on the majority shareholders’
143
misrepresentations to the investing public generally. The minority
shareholder did not seek monetary damages but sought injunctive relief requiring an end to the alleged deceptions and disclosure of past
144
deceptions. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that the minority shareholder had standing to assert his
claims under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, but dismissed the claims
145
on other grounds.
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that the minority shareholder
had no standing to pursue his action for injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because he did not satisfy the purchaser-

140

See, e.g., Cowin v. Bresler, 741 F.2d 410, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that the
purchase or sale requirement applies to both actions for damages and actions for injunctive relief); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Edelman, No. C-87-274-G, 1987 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9624, at *4–7 (M.D.N.C. July 30, 1987) (holding that an issuer of stock could
not have standing to sue for injunctive relief unless it was in connection with a purchase or sale based on the alleged misrepresentation); Atl. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of
Fort Lauderdale v. Dade Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 592 F. Supp. 1089, 1092 (S.D. Fla. 1984)
(denying standing to an issuer and stockholder under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
in an action for injunctive relief without mention of the injunctive relief exception
because the issuer and the stockholder failed to allege that they were purchasers or
sellers); W.A. Krueger Co. v. Kirkpatrick, Pettis, Smith, Polian, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 800,
805–06 (D. Neb. 1979) (holding that actions for injunctive relief under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 are subject to the purchaser-seller requirement); Wright v. Heizer
Corp., 411 F. Supp. 23, 34 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (holding that Blue Chip is applicable to
both actions at law and at equity), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir.
1977).
141
741 F.2d at 423.
142
Id. at 412.
143
Id. at 419.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 413 n.1.
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146

seller rule. In reaching its holding, the court stated that most of the
Supreme Court’s reasoning for employing the purchaser-seller rule
in Blue Chip applied regardless of whether a plaintiff is seeking damages or injunctive relief. Judge Bork, writing for the D.C. Circuit, also
relied heavily on the text of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5:
The scope of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is limited to fraud “in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security.” Congress was
asked on two different occasions to expand the jurisdictional
reach of those provisions but chose not to. In contrast, Congress
did choose to define the scope of other provisions in the 1933
and 1934 Acts in terms that clearly reflected a broader jurisdictional reach. Congress also limited standing in those instances
where it did create express remedies under the Act to a class of
147
persons including only purchasers or sellers.

Judge Bork went on to say that fashioning a different concept for
cases involving injunctive relief, rather than monetary damages would
148
be “altogether too awkward to be persuasive.”
Simply put, courts are divided on the existence of an injunctive
relief exception to the purchaser-seller rule that was announced in
Blue Chip. Unless Congress acts, the Supreme Court will ultimately
have to decide whether this exception and various other exceptions
to the purchaser-seller rule continue to exist.
III. CORPORATE ISSUER STANDING AND ITS POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS.
Most cases waiving the purchaser-seller rule have been brought
149
by shareholder plaintiffs.
Some courts, however, are cautious but
willing to grant corporate issuers standing under section 10(b) and
150
Rule 10b-5 to seek injunctive relief without a purchase or a sale.
146

Id. at 423–25.
Cowin, 741 F.2d at 424.
148
Id.
149
Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts Inc., 963 F. Supp. 395,
399 (D.N.J. 1997) (evaluating the existence and scope of the injunctive relief exception to the purchaser-seller rule).
150
See, e.g., Gen. Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir.
1968) (“There are many practical advantages . . . in allowing a corporation in certain
cases to enjoin manipulation of its stock, although courts must act both with speed
and with caution lest such actions become vehicles for management to thwart purchases in the true interest of the stockholder.”); USG Corp. v. Wagner & Brown, 689
F. Supp. 1483, 1493–94 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (allowing a corporate issuer to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security); Foster Wheeler Corp. v. Edelman, No. 87-4346 (GEB), 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16783, at *8–12 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 1987) (recognizing standing for an issuer to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a
security); Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Res. Ltd., 574 F. Supp. 1172, 1198
147
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For instance, an issuer may have standing under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 to seek injunctive relief without a purchase or sale in circumstances in which an issuer has suffered or will suffer direct injury
because of the alleged manipulation or in which the issuer would be
the most appropriate party to assert a violation affecting all its share151
holders.
Courts have substantial power in determining whether a corporate issuer has standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 without a purchase or a sale because the private right
152
of action under these provisions is judicially implied. In Blue Chip,
the Supreme Court relied on policy considerations in adopting the
purchaser-seller rule because “neither the congressional enactment
153
nor the administrative regulations offer[ed] conclusive guidance.”
Policy considerations will play a key role when the Supreme
Court ultimately rules on whether any exception survived the adop154
tion of the purchaser-seller requirement in Blue Chip.
Of course,
155
156
the statutory schemes of the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act will need
157
to be taken into account in any standing analysis, but the Supreme
Court has made clear that the implied right of action under section
(N.D. Ohio 1982) (holding that an issuer could maintain an action for injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security);
see also Standard Metals Corp. v. Tomlin, 503 F. Supp. 586, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (refusing to employ or extend the scope of the narrow exception to the purchaser-seller
rule for issuers seeking injunctive relief because other grounds for relief were available); but see Liberty Nat’l Ins. Holding Co. v. Charter Co., 734 F.2d 545, 554–59
(11th Cir. 1984) (holding that an issuer does not have standing to bring an action for
injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without a purchase or a sale);
W.A. Krueger Co. v. Kirkpatrick, Pettis, Smith, Polian, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 800, 805–06
(D. Neb. 1979) (holding that an issuer must allege a purchase or sale of stock to
bring an action for injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
151
See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 722 n.27 (2d Cir. 1971) (“We do
not foreclose the possibility, for example, that an issuer might have standing under
10b-5 to seek injunctive relief in circumstances where, despite the absence of a purchase or sale, it has suffered or will suffer direct injury because of the alleged fraud,
or where it would be the most appropriate party to assert 10b-5 violations affecting all
of its shareholders.”).
152
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 748–49 (1975) (discussing the purchaser-seller rule and the possible existence of an injunctive relief exception).
153
Id. at 737.
154
See supra Part I (discussing the Supreme Court’s wide discretion in determining
standing under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because it is a judicially implied private
right of action).
155
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
156
Id. §§ 78a–77mm.
157
See Cowin v. Bresler, 741 F.2d 410, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[I]n the process of
implying private rights judges must take account of the statutory scheme.”).
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10(b) and Rule 10b-5 has grown far beyond the text of the statute
158
and the administrative rule.
In determining whether a corporate issuer has standing to seek
injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security, strong policy justifications exist for such an
exception to the purchaser-seller rule. Although the Supreme
Court’s holding in Blue Chip foreclosed a corporate issuer’s standing
to seek monetary damages without the purchase or sale of a secu159
rity, current case law suggests that the purchaser-seller rule might
160
not apply in cases in which a corporate issuer seeks injunctive relief.
Such an exception is justified for a corporate issuer seeking injunctive
relief because of the nature of injunctive relief, the injury to the issuer, and the role of the issuer as best champion of its shareholders.
These policy justifications are examined below.
A. The Nature of Injunctive Relief
The first policy justification for allowing a corporate issuer standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without a purchase or a sale of a security relates to the nature of injunctive relief in comparison to monetary damages. Injunctive relief is
substantially different from monetary damages and merits different
treatment by the courts. Allowing actions for injunctive relief under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security does not create the same concerns about unjust enrichment, is
consistent with the purposes underlying the securities acts, and is
consistent with the terms of the 1934 Act.
Actions for injunctive relief do not generate the same concerns
as actions for monetary damages because injunctive relief does not
create the same possibility for unjust enrichment. In Blue Chip, the
policy justifications cited by the Supreme Court for adopting the purchaser-seller rule in actions involving monetary relief stemmed from
concerns regarding the possibility of unscrupulous plaintiffs receiving
161
windfall settlements and judgments. Based on the fear of vexatious
158

See Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 737 (“When we deal with private actions under Rule
10b-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative
acorn.”).
159
See id. at 731–32 (holding that the purchaser-seller rule requires plaintiffs to be
purchasers and sellers “for purposes of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 private damage actions”); LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 114, at 3735 n.625 (“[A]n issuer that is neither a
purchaser nor a seller lacks standing under § 10(b), at least to sue for damages.”).
160
See supra Part II.C (discussing the injunctive relief exception to the purchaserseller rule).
161
See Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 739–49.
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162

litigation, the Supreme Court stated two policy justifications that
163
The Court
mandated the adoption of the purchaser-seller rule.
first cited its concern that strike suits would become commonplace in
164
the absence of the purchaser-seller rule.
The Court was worried
about expanding the class of plaintiffs under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 to allow actions that would have settlement value out of propor165
tion to any prospective success at trial. Second, the Court was concerned that allowing standing to sue for monetary damages under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 would subject the trier of fact to many
166
“rather hazy issues of historical fact.”
In assessing this risk, Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated, “The very real risk . . . is
167
that the door will be open to recovery of substantial damages . . . .”
In short, both of the Court’s policy justifications are chiefly based on
the fear that allowing a plaintiff standing to seek monetary relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without a purchase or a sale raises a
substantial possibility of unworthy plaintiffs being unjustly enriched.
Allowing an issuer standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security
does not create the same danger of unjust enrichment that the Supreme Court used to justify its adoption of the purchaser-seller rule
in actions for monetary damages. Although economic concerns are
implicated in actions for injunctive relief, injunctive relief provides an
across-the-board benefit to all shareholders of a corporation and
168
promotes the well-being of the corporation itself.
Allowing an is162

See id. at 739 (“There has been widespread recognition that litigation under
Rule 10b-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from
that which accompanies litigation in general.”).
163
Id. at 739–49.
164
Id. at 740–43.
165
Id.
166
Id. at 743.
167
Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 746.
168
Notably, allowing an issuer standing to seek injunctive relief under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security helps to protect various classes of individuals who would not be allowed to seek monetary relief under
these provisions because of the purchaser-seller requirement. In Blue Chip, the Court
outlined the three classes of potential plaintiffs who are barred by the purchaserseller requirement:
First are potential purchasers of shares, either in a new offering or on
the Nation’s post-distribution trading markets, who allege that they decided not to purchase because of an unduly gloomy representation or
the omission of favorable material which made the issuer appear to be
a less favorable investment vehicle than it actually was. Second are actual shareholders in the issuer who allege that they decided not to sell
their shares because of an unduly rosy representation or a failure to
disclose unfavorable material. Third are shareholders, creditors, and
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suer standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security does not create a
windfall for unscrupulous plaintiffs, and the Supreme Court’s policy
justifications in Blue Chip do not apply because the possibility of wind169
fall judgments and settlements is not present.
In fact, allowing a corporate issuer standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is consistent with the pur170
poses that underlie securities acts. As stated previously, Congress
promulgated the 1933 Act (1) to require that investors be provided
with material information regarding securities offered for public sale
and (2) to prevent misrepresentation, fraud, and deceit in the sale of
171
securities. Congress created the 1934 Act for a variety of reasons relating to the “national public interest,” e.g., the important relationship between fair and honest markets and interstate commerce, the
dangers of market manipulation, and the fear of national emergen172
cies created by unreasonable fluctuations in security prices.
In
short, Congress wanted to protect the integrity of securities transactions through fair disclosure of information regarding these securities.
Allowing a corporate issuer standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without a purchase or sale of a security is consistent with the purposes of the securities acts because injunctive relief allows the issuer to help correct a manipulative or

perhaps others related to an issuer who suffered loss in the value of
their investment due to corporate or insider activities in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities which violate Rule 10b-5.
Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 737–38. By adopting the purchaser-seller requirement, the
Court denied standing to these three classes of potential plaintiffs. Id. The Court
admitted that some worthy plaintiffs would not be able to seek monetary damages
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because of the purchaser-seller requirement, but
the Court still adopted the requirement because of concerns regarding vexatious litigation without the requirement. Id. at 738–39. Allowing an issuer standing to seek
injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a
security helps to protect the classes of plaintiffs who are denied relief by the purchaser-seller requirement because the issuer can correct an ongoing deceptive or
manipulative act that would cause harm to all classes of potential plaintiffs, rather
than just purchasers or sellers.
169
But see infra Part IV.B (discussing possible misuse of section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 by corporate directors for purposes of management entrenchment).
170
See supra Part II.A (discussing the advent of federal securities laws).
171
EISENBERG, supra note 22, at 1285 (discussing the public distribution of securities and the requirements of the 1933 Act).
172
15 U.S.C. § 78b (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (providing the “necessity” for the regulation contained within the 1934 Act).
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173

deceptive act or omission.
For example, in Moore v. Greatamerica
174
Corp., the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio held that an issuer had standing to seek injunctive relief under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security because it was consistent with the public policy underlying the
statute and the rule. In that case, The Glidden Company (“Glidden”)
sought injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 against
Greatamerica Corporation (“Greatamerica”) based on allegedly deceptive statements made in connection with a tender offer to pur175
chase Glidden stock. Even though Glidden had not bought or sold
based on the allegedly deceptive statements, the court held that
Glidden had standing to seek injunctive relief to keep Greatamerica
176
from moving forward with the tender offer. In reaching this holding, the court relied upon the “sound public policy” underlying section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to “protect the unwary and the inexperienced buyers and sellers” and “to eliminate any undesirable
177
practices.”
In contrast to actions for monetary damages under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5, actions for injunctive relief should not be subject to
the purchaser-seller rule because they directly serve the reasons Congress passed the securities acts. Damages actions under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 are backward-looking because they are remedial in
nature. In contrast, actions for injunctive relief under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 are forward-looking because they seek to correct an
178
ongoing fraud. Simply put, actions for injunctive relief protect the
integrity of securities transactions by forcing the fair disclosure of in179
formation regarding securities.
Allowing issuers standing to seek
173

See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 722 n.27 (2d Cir. 1971) (“The issuer, for example, may have standing to enjoin a manipulative scheme which had the
effect of depressing the price of the issuer’s stock immediately prior to a contemplated issue of securities, or it may have standing to enjoin a fraud whose purpose
was to inflate the market value of the stock of a company with which the issuer was
negotiating a merger.”).
174
274 F. Supp. 490 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
175
Id. at 492.
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
See supra note 124, infra note 186 (providing case law holding that the injunctive relief exception applies only to ongoing fraud).
179
See, e.g., Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 156 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that the injunctive relief exception to the purchaser-seller requirement is “premised on the policy of the Securities Exchange Act to eliminate deceptive and unfair practices in security trading and to protect the public from inaccurate, incomplete, and misleading
information”); Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 173 (3d Cir. 1970) (recognizing
standing for plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
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injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 dovetails into
the purposes for which the 1933 Act and 1934 Act were created in a
way that actions for monetary damages do not.
Additionally, allowing a corporate issuer standing under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without a purchase or a sale is consistent with
the terms of the 1934 Act. In Blue Chip, one of the arguments that
the Court offered in favor of the purchaser-seller rule was that section
180
28(a) of the 1934 Act required that any private damages action
181
brought under the 1934 Act be limited to “actual damages.”
Section 28(a) in relevant part provides, “[N]o person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under [the 1934 Act] shall recover, through
satisfaction of judgment in one or more actions, a total amount in
182
excess of his actual damages on account of the act complained of.”
In Blue Chip, the Court stated its concern that in the absence of the
purchaser-seller rule, determining damages based on failure to pur183
chase or sell would be highly speculative and uncertain.
Section 28(a) does not pose a concern in actions for injunctive
relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The Supreme Court’s reasoning that section 28(a) validates the purchaser-seller rule is inapposite because actions for injunctive relief do not involve an award of
184
“actual damages.”
In sum, injunctive relief varies greatly from actions for monetary damage, and different treatment for actions for injunctive relief and actions for monetary relief is not in conflict with
the Supreme Court’s holding in Blue Chip.

without a purchase or a sale because “[t]he thrust of the [1934] Act and the decisions interpreting it is to give the investing public the opportunity to make knowing
and intelligent decisions regarding the purchase or sale of securities”); Granada
Invs., Inc. v. DWG Corp., 717 F. Supp. 533, 536 (N.D. Ohio 1989) (“The policies embodied in the Exchange Act of eliminating deceptive and unfair practices in securities trading and protecting the public from inaccurate and misleading information
are clearly advanced by permitting aggrieved shareholders to bring suits to enjoin
wrongful acts.”); Moore v. Greatamerica Corp., 274 F. Supp. 490, 492 (N.D. Ohio
1967) (recognizing standing for an issuer to seek injunctive relief under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security because it furthers
the policies underlying the statute and rule).
180
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2000).
181
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 734–35 (1975).
182
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2000).
183
Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 734–35 (“In contrast, a putative plaintiff, who neither
purchases nor sells securities but sues instead for intangible economic injury such as
loss of a noncontractual opportunity to buy or sell, is more likely to be seeking a
largely conjectural and speculative recovery in which the number of shares involved
will depend on the plaintiff’s subjective hypothesis.”).
184
Id.
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B. Irreparable Injury to the Issuer
In The Law of Securities Regulation, Professor Thomas Lee Hazen
writes, “[E]ven among those courts that do not require the plaintiff
in an injunction action to have been a purchaser or seller, the plaintiff must still be able to show some direct injury resulting from the al185
leged Rule 10b-5 violation.” A corporate issuer will only have standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 if the
issuer can demonstrate that the continuation of the alleged decep186
tion will cause some injury to the issuer.
187
In Avnet, Inc. v. Scope Industries, for example, because a corporate issuer had failed to plead any injury, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York held that the issuer
could not maintain an action for injunctive relief under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5. In that case, Avnet, Inc. (“Avnet”) brought suit
against a shareholder for an alleged manipulative scheme to gain
188
greater control of the corporation. Avnet requested that the shareholder be enjoined from further action, unless the shareholder cor189
After recognizing a corporected the alleged misrepresentations.
rate issuer’s right to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, the court held that the shareholder had failed to allege

185

HAZEN, supra note 7, § 12.7[2] (discussing standing to seek injunctive relief
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
186
See, e.g., Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts Inc., 140 F.3d
478, 486 (3d Cir. 1998) (opting not to rule on the existence of the injunctive relief
exception to the purchaser-seller requirement because the plaintiff had failed to establish any causal link between its alleged loss and the alleged violation of section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5); Advanced Res. Int’l, Inc. v. Tri-Star Petroleum Co., 4 F.3d
327, 333 (4th Cir. 1993) (declining to decide whether an injunctive relief exception
to the purchaser-seller rule exists and denying standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to a plaintiff whose injuries were “too far removed,
causally, from the sale or purchase of securities . . . even under a relaxed rule applicable to injunctive relief cases”); Granada Invs., Inc. v. DWG Corp., 717 F. Supp. 533,
535 (N.D. Ohio 1989) (“A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate,
through the use of substantial and verifiable evidence, that he will be injured by the
continuation of past and present wrongdoing.”); Foster Wheeler Corp. v. Edelman,
No. 87-4346 (GEB), 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16783, at *10–12 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 1987)
(holding that to have standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security a causal connection must be established between the alleged wrong and the harm suffered); Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349, 1359 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (“A plaintiff requesting injunctive relief [under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5] must demonstrate that the
continuation of past and present practices will injure him.”); see also supra note 124.
187
499 F. Supp. 1121, 1128–29 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
188
Id. at 1123.
189
Id.
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190

sufficient injury to maintain its action. The court wrote, “The complaint alleges market manipulation, but does not specify how that
manipulation injured Avnet, why or how Avnet may be the best
champion of its shareholders’ rights here, or any other reason to al191
low it to sue under Rule 10b-5 here.” Put simply, without injury, an
issuer has no standing.
When a corporate issuer seeks injunctive relief under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without a purchase or a sale of a security, the
injury to the issuer helps to justify standing and provides a reason to
make an exception to the purchaser-seller requirement. Allowing an
issuer standing to seek injunctive relief protects the issuer from being
crippled by manipulative acts and mitigates damages from a fraud or
deception.
A corporate issuer should be allowed standing under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because securities manipulation may have crippling results. When Congress codified the “Necessity for Regulation”
in the 1934 Act, it stated that securities markets “constitute an important part of the current of interstate commerce” and have a signifi192
cant role in trade and industry.
When securities manipulation occurs, the damage to a corporation or other issuer of securities can be
193
significant.
The issuer may face a devaluation of stock, decline in
credit rating, inability to merge with other business entities, and a
194
myriad of other problems. If an issuer is injured by securities manipulation, it has a chilling effect on interstate commerce and negatively effects industry. Allowing an issuer standing to pursue injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without a purchase or a
sale is warranted because it is consistent with the policy justifications
advanced for the existence of the 1934 Act.
Issuer standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security also helps mitigate the damage created by a fraud or deception. When an issuer is
injured by a manipulative or deceptive act, the holders of its securi195
ties are ultimately harmed. The initial injury to the issuer is a first
190

Id. at 1128–29 (holding that Avnet had failed to plead fraud with particularity
as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)).
191
Id. at 1128.
192
15 U.S.C. § 78b (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (providing the “necessity” for the regulation contained within the 1934 Act).
193
Comment, supra note 11, at 629 (discussing the problems created by securities
fraud).
194
Id.
195
Id. (“[D]amage actions are an outgrowth from [section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5]
to compensate those who have been injured when the damage was not prevented.”).
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order harm that leads to the second order harm affecting holders of
196
its securities. If an issuer is able to enjoin or prevent the harm to itself, then the damage to the holders of its securities is lessened or
197
does not occur. Allowing an issuer standing to seek injunctive relief
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is justified because it stops the
harm to the issuer and potentially prevents the need for numerous
198
damages suits.
C. The Corporate Issuer as Best Champion of Shareholders’ Rights
A corporate issuer should have standing to seek injunctive relief
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a
security because the corporate form makes it uniquely capable to
champion the rights of its shareholders. The corporate issuer is the
best champion of its shareholders because it allows for collective action, possesses extensive resources, and prevents overburdening the
SEC.
Allowing a corporate issuer standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in the absence of a sale is justified
because the corporate form enables individuals to act collectively,
rather than as fragmented segments. In Cox & Hazen on Corporations,
Professors James D. Cox and Thomas Lee Hazen state, “The corporate form . . . facilitates a good amount of efficiency: Those with
managerial skills and experience are entrusted with the capital of
their investors . . . to make an optimal use of their energies by devot199
ing themselves to their individual vocations.”
In short, the corporate form enables individuals to act together with centralized man200
agement that has both experience and expertise.
Allowing a corporate issuer standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without a purchase or sale of a security enables all individuals who might potentially have been
harmed by an alleged deception to sue as a unified group with most
likely better legal counsel and more litigation experience. Moreover,
allowing an issuer standing to seek injunctive relief also may prevent
196

See id.
See id.
198
See also supra note 168 (discussing why allowing an issuer standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a
security provides relief to deserving individuals who would not have standing to sue
under these provisions).
199
1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX & HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS § 1.05
(2d ed. 2003) (discussing the virtues of the corporate form).
200
See, e.g., id.; EISENBERG, supra note 22, at 100 (noting that centralized management is one of the characteristics of the corporate form).
197
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numerous damages actions that may result if harm is allowed to con201
tinue without an action for injunctive relief. One action for injunctive relief by a corporate issuer that did not purchase or sell based on
an alleged deception is preferable to scores of damages suits that may
202
result if a deception is not abated.
Beyond the benefits of collective action, allowing an issuer standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security is also justified because a corporate issuer likely has better resources to ensure that an action is
properly litigated. An issuer’s management is almost certain to have
better information about the value of corporate assets, earning potential, future earnings, and a variety of other factors that determine
203
the correct price of the issuer’s stock. Because of this, the issuer’s
management is in a better position to detect and potentially remedy a
deception relating to the corporation’s securities.
A corporate issuer also has better resources to ensure that an action for injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is properly litigated because it likely has the capital necessary to bring a suit
204
promptly before its shareholders are harmed. One of the virtues of
the corporate form is that it allows capital to be aggregated so that
205
individuals can come together to weather the perils of business. In
almost every instance, the ability to aggregate capital allows the issuer
to litigate claims under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 better than any
individual shareholder.
Furthermore, a corporate issuer is the best champion of its
shareholders’ rights and should have standing under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 without a purchase or sale because allowing such
standing will prevent overburdening the SEC with enforcement actions. Section 21(e) of the 1934 Act expressly gives the SEC the
power to enforce section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase
206
or sale of a security.
If a corporate issuer has standing to seek in-

201

See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.B.
203
Comment, supra note 11, at 628–29 (discussing why a “corporation is in a
markedly better position to protect its shareholders’ interests than are the shareholders themselves”).
204
See id.
205
See, e.g., COX & HAZEN, supra note 199, § 1.05 (stating that the corporate form
assembles and combines the amount of capital necessary to participate in modern
business); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (“Corporations are a necessary feature of modern business activity, and their aggregated capital has become the source
of nearly all great enterprises”).
206
15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
202
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junctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security, then the SEC has numerous allies in fulfill207
ing its obligations under the 1934 Act.
Allowing an issuer standing under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
without a purchase or a sale makes sense because the most concentrated benefit of correcting a deception or fraud goes to the issuer of
the securities. Although correcting a deception or fraud helps fulfill
the underlying reasons for the 1933 Act and 1934 Act, the issuer and
its shareholders gain the greatest benefit and should be charged with
paying some of the expense for this benefit.
IV. OBSTACLES IN THE WAY OF ISSUER STANDING
Even though strong policy justifications exist for a corporate issuer to have standing to seek injunctive relief without the purchase or
sale of a security, significant obstacles stand in the way of the Supreme Court holding that such standing is available. The Court does
have substantial power in defining the contours of the private right of
action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because it is judicially im208
plied. However, arguments against the existence of issuer standing
without a purchase or sale can be founded upon the Supreme
Court’s aversion to broadening standing under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, the possible misuse of issuer standing by directors and officers, and interpretation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in the con209
210
text of the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act.
A. The Court’s Aversion to Broadening Standing Under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
The Supreme Court has never addressed whether an issuer has
standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
207

See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (holding that an implied
private right of action exists under section 14(a) of the 1934 Act because private enforcement is a “necessary supplement” to SEC action); Mut. Shares Corp. v. Genesco,
Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 546–47 (2d Cir. 1967) (recognizing standing for stockholders
seeking injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or
sale of a security in part because allowing standing helps the SEC to enforce the 1934
Act); Granada Invs., Inc. v. DWG Corp., 717 F. Supp. 533, 536 (N.D. Ohio 1989)
(holding that standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
without the purchase or sale of a security allows plaintiffs to “protect their rights and
assist in the enforcement of the federal securities laws”).
208
See supra Part I (discussing the Supreme Court’s wide discretion in determining
standing under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because it is a judicially implied private
right of action).
209
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
210
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
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without the purchase or sale of a security, but a number of its opin211
ions, including Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, create significant concerns about whether such standing exists. Supreme Court
case law shows that the Court is generally opposed to broadening
standing under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and adverse to making
exceptions to the purchaser-seller rule. Moreover, the Court adopted
the purchaser-seller rule from a case that applied the rule to an action for injunctive relief.
Although the Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed the existence of a private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b212
213
5, the Court has been opposed to broadening that standing.
Since the mid 1970s, many implied private rights of action under the
214
securities laws have been significantly narrowed.
Because of the
Supreme Court’s restrictive approach, lower courts have also become
215
less willing to broaden any existing implied remedies.
In terms of the private right of action under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, the Supreme Court has limited standing in damages ac216
tions to purchasers and sellers of securities, required a showing of

211

421 U.S. 723 (1975); see also Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461,
462 (2d Cir. 1952) (providing the rule that became the basis for the Blue Chip decision).
212
See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (“Judicial interpretation and application, legislative acquiescence, and the passage of time have removed any doubt that a private cause of action exists for a violation of Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5, and constitutes an essential tool for enforcement of the 1934 Act’s
requirements.”); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (“The
existence of this implied remedy [under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5] is simply beyond peradventure.”); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976) (holding that the implied private cause of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is
“well established”).
213
Some commentators have gone so far as to suggest that if Blue Chip was decided today, the Supreme Court would hold that no private right of action exists under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. See ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON,
UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW § 13.02[A] (1999) (“A fair guess is that if the issue
were to arise for the first time today, the Supreme Court would hold that no private
right of action exists, leaving enforcement of the rule to the SEC alone.”).
214
See HAZEN, supra note 7, § 12.2[1] (discussing the general trend of limiting implied remedies under the securities laws).
215
See id. § 12.2[2] (“There can be no doubt . . . that the restrictive trend in the
Supreme Court has cut back on the lower courts’ willingness to create additional
remedies. The overwhelming majority of recent cases has denied the existence of
any other than the well-established implied remedies.” (footnotes omitted)).
216
Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 731–32 (holding that standing in damages actions under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is limited to purchasers or sellers of securities).
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217

scienter, held that the conduct complained of must be “manipulat218
ive or deceptive,” and ruled that a private right of action does not
219
exist against aiders and abettors. The Supreme Court did hold that
an implied private right of action exists under section 10(b) and Rule
220
10b-5 even though other express remedies are available. However,
the Court has substantially limited the scope of the implied right of
action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
The Court has great discretion in determining the contours of
221
the private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and
substantial policy justifications exist for allowing issuer standing to
222
seek injunctive relief without a purchase or a sale. Nevertheless, the
existence of issuer standing to seek injunctive relief under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without a purchase or a sale is questionable because of the Supreme Court’s general opposition to broadening implied remedies under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Blue Chip demonstrates that the Supreme Court may be adverse
to making exceptions to the purchaser-seller rule. In Blue Chip, the
Supreme Court both adopted the purchaser-seller rule and refused to
make an exception to that rule for aborted transaction cases in which
the manipulative or deceptive act prevented the consummation of a
223
purchase or a sale. As previously discussed, the aborted transaction
exception, the injunctive relief exception, and other various exceptions developed during the interim between the announcement of
224
the purchaser-seller rule in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp. and the

217

Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194–214 (1976) (holding that a private cause of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 requires a showing of scienter on the part of the defendant).
218
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473–74 (1977) (holding that section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 only apply to conduct that is either manipulative or deceptive).
219
Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
191–92 (1994) (holding that a private right of action does not exist against those who
aid and abet a violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
220
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380–87 (1983) (holding that
an implied cause of action exists under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 even though
express remedies exist covering the same transaction).
221
See supra Part I (discussing the Supreme Court’s wide discretion in determining
standing under section 10(b) and rule 10b–5 because it is a judicially implied private
right of action).
222
See supra Part III.
223
See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754–55 (1975) (rejecting the aborted transaction exception); supra Part II.C (analyzing the development and rejection of the aborted transaction exception).
224
193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
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225

adoption of the rule in Blue Chip. The Supreme Court’s rejection of
the aborted transaction exception in Blue Chip suggests that the Court
may ultimately reject all of the exceptions that developed to the purchaser-seller rule.
If Blue Chip implicitly rejected all exceptions to the purchaseseller rule, a corporate issuer will not have standing to seek injunctive
relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or
sale of a security. Of course, Blue Chip can also be read narrowly as
applying the purchaser-seller rule only to actions for damages, which
is why the question of issuer standing to seek injunctive relief remains
open.
The fact that the Supreme Court adopted the purchaser-seller
rule from a case that applied the rule to an action for injunctive relief
also casts doubt on the existence of issuer standing to seek injunctive
relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or
sale of a security. In Blue Chip, the Supreme Court adopted the pur226
chaser-seller rule that was announced in Birnbaum. The Court went
so far as to state: “[W]e are of the opinion that Birnbaum was rightly
227
Although not emphasized in the Second Circuit’s opindecided.”
ion, Birnbaum was an action in equity under section 10(b) and Rule
228
10b-5.
In fact, the plaintiffs in Birnbaum explicitly sought and were denied standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule
229
10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security. As previously discussed, in Birnbaum, a group of shareholders of Newport Steel Corporation (“Newport”) alleged that the president and various members of the board of directors of Newport defrauded the shareholders
by permitting the president to sell his forty percent of stock in Newport to Wilport Company (“Wilport”) for a large profit after rejecting
a tender offer that would have been profitable to all of the share230
holders. Employing section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the shareholders
225

See supra Part II.C (discussing various exceptions to the purchaser-seller rule
that were created between Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 98 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y.
1951), and Blue Chip).
226
Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 731 (adopting the rule announced in Birnbaum).
227
Id.
228
See Birnbaum, 98 F. Supp. at 508; see also Cowin v. Bresler, 741 F.2d 410, 420
n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“Though not apparent from the Second Circuit’s opinion,
Birnbaum was a suit in equity seeking rescission of a sale allegedly violative of Rule
10b-5 and an accounting by the defendants.”); Liberty Nat’l Ins. Holding Co. v. Charter Co., 734 F.2d 545, 557 n.26 (11th Cir. 1984) (“Birnbaum . . . was a suit in equity,
though this is not apparent from the court of appeals’ opinion.”).
229
98 F. Supp. at 508.
230
Id.
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requested rescission of the sale of the stock, injunction of certain individuals from causing any future sale of the stock to Wilport, and an
231
accounting by various defendants. The United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York dismissed the case because the
shareholders had not purchased or sold securities in connection with
232
the alleged deception, and the Second Circuit affirmed the lower
233
court’s opinion.
When the Supreme Court adopted the purchaser-seller rule that
was announced in Birnbaum, the Court may have implicitly answered
whether an issuer or anyone else may have standing to seek injunctive
relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or
sale of a security. The Supreme Court may have already foreclosed
the injunctive relief exception to the purchaser-seller rule because
Birnbaum was a case directly applying the purchaser-seller rule to a
plea for injunctive relief.
Blue Chip, however, did not explicitly address whether injunctive
relief is available under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the
purchase or sale of the security, so issuer standing may still be available. Notably, the injunctive relief exception to the purchaser-seller
rule is well established in the Second Circuit, which is the court that
234
decided Birnbaum.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s endorsement of the holding in Birnbaum, its aversion to making exceptions to
the purchaser-seller rule, and its general opposition to expanding
implied rights of action create significant concerns about whether an
issuer will be able to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security.
B. Possible Misuse of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by
Corporate Directors
Concerns about possible misuse of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
may also dissuade the Supreme Court from holding that issuers have
standing to seek injunctive relief without the purchase or sale of a security. As mentioned previously, the Court’s holding in Blue Chip was
largely based on policy concerns because “neither the congressional
enactment nor the administrative regulations offer conclusive guid235
ance.” Although the Court’s policy considerations for adopting the
purchaser-seller rule in actions for monetary damage do not apply in
231
232
233
234
235

Id.
Id. at 508–09.
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1952).
See supra note 138.
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).

CHAFFEE FINAL

2006]

5/30/2006 8:39:33 PM

BEYOND BLUE CHIP

1173

236

actions for injunctive relief, the Court may find possible misuse by
corporate directors a compelling reason to hold that an issuer does
not have standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security.
237
In Liberty National Insurance Holding Co. v. Charter Co., for example, concerns about improper entrenchment by corporate management prompted the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit to hold that an issuer does not have standing to seek
injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security. In that case, Liberty National Insurance
Holding Company (“Liberty National”) alleged that Charter Company and some of its subsidiaries (collectively “Charter”) had violated
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when Charter filed the required schedule 13D reporting statement after it began acquiring Liberty National
238
stock.
Based on alleged misrepresentations in the 13D statement,
Liberty National sought injunctive relief requiring Charter to divest
239
itself of Liberty National stock. The United States District Court for
the Northern District of Alabama dismissed the claim because Liberty
National had not purchased or sold based on the alleged decep240
tion.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court and
held that an issuer cannot seek injunctive relief under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security as a means
241
to fend off a corporate control contest. The Court wrote, “[a] little
knowledge of the delicate nature of the market for corporate control
convinces us that there is no sound reason to provide an additional
shield . . . with which entrenched management can fend off hostile
242
takeover attempts.” Other courts have reached similar conclusions
when corporate issuers have attempted to use section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 to defend against corporate control contests without the pur243
chase or sale of a security.
236

See supra Part III.A (explaining that the policy considerations for adopting the
purchaser-seller rule in Blue Chip do not apply to actions for injunctive relief because
the same concerns about unjust enrichment do not apply to actions for injunctive relief).
237
734 F.2d 545 (11th Cir. 1984).
238
Id. at 547–48.
239
Id. at 548.
240
Id. at 553.
241
Id. at 558–59.
242
Id. at 559.
243
See, e.g., John Labatt Ltd. v. Onex Corp., 890 F. Supp. 235, 247–48 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (holding that an issuer that is the target of a tender offer may not seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a secu-
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Arguably, Liberty National only limits the exception to the purchaser-seller rule that allows an entity to seek injunctive relief under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security. The Supreme Court could hold that an injunctive relief exception exists to the purchaser-seller rule except in cases in which the
purpose is management entrenchment.
This interpretation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is highly tortured. Although section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 have grown far beyond
244
the statutory enactment and administrative rule, and the Supreme
Court has broad discretion in determining the contours of a judicially
245
implied cause of action, creating exceptions to exceptions may be
beyond what the Court is willing to allow.

rity); Equity Oil Co. v. Consol. Oil & Gas, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 507, 514 (D. Utah 1983)
(holding that an issuer does not have standing in corporate control contests to seek
injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without a purchase or sale because “entrenched management can use a suit for an injunction with voluminous
discovery requests, for its delay value to defeat any takeover attempt, regardless of the
merits of the case” (footnote omitted)); Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Hi-Shear Indus., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1122, 1134 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (“[I]t would be senseless to allow
target management to wield [Rule 10b-5] as a weapon in takeover bids when Congress has enacted Sections 13(d), 14(d), and 14(e) specifically to ensure fairness in
battles for corporate control.”); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 490 F. Supp. 660, 666
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (finding that an issuer did not have standing to seek injunctive relief
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security in part
because of the management’s interest in retaining control of the corporation); Mosinee Paper Corp. v. Rondeau, 354 F. Supp. 686, 697–98 (W.D. Wis. 1973) (holding
that an issuer does not have standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security when management is involved in a fight to control the corporation). But see USG Corp. v. Cottle, 689 F.
Supp. 1483, 1493–94 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that an issuer had standing to enjoin
the pursuit of a tender offer using section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security); Foster Wheeler Corp. v. Edelman, No. 87-4346 (GEB),
1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16783, at *8–12 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 1987) (recognizing that an issuer had standing to seek injunctive relief in the context of a tender offer under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security); Hanna Mining
Co. v. Norcen Energy Res. Ltd., 574 F. Supp. 1172, 1198 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (holding
that the target of a corporate takeover had standing to seek injunctive relief under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security); Moore v.
Greatamerica Corp., 274 F. Supp. 490, 492 (N.D. Ohio 1967) (granting an issuer
standing in the context of a tender offer to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security to help “eliminate any undesirable practices” in the securities marketplace).
244
See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) (“When
we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has
grown from little more than a legislative acorn.”).
245
See id. at 748–49 (discussing the purchaser-seller rule and the possible existence of an injunctive relief exception).
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C. Statutory Interpretation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
246

In Cowin v. Bresler, Judge Bork, writing for the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, stated:
It is true, as the Court in Blue Chip acknowledged, that the question of what constitutes the proper plaintiff class under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 cannot be conclusively determined by resort
to the text of those enactments; as one might expect, neither the
statute nor the rule speaks directly to the question of who may sue
since the right to sue was created afterwards by the judiciary. Still,
in the process of implying private rights judges must take account
of the statutory scheme. No better guidance exists than the lan247
guage of the relevant statute and regulation.

Although section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not provide conclusive
guidance regarding issuer standing to seek injunctive relief without
the purchase or sale of a security, the Court may refuse to find the existence of such standing because of judicial restraint, the limitations
placed on other express remedies in the 1934 Act, and the wording of
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
The Court may exercise judicial restraint and deny issuers standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security because the existence of such
standing would require an extremely tortured interpretation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. As the Court noted in Blue Chip, “the
wording of § 10(b), making fraud in connection with the purchase or sale
of a security a violation of the Act, is surely badly strained when construed to provide a cause of action, not to purchasers and sellers of
248
securities, but to the world at large.” In Cowin v. Bresler, for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit denied standing under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to individuals seeking injunctive relief without the purchase or sale of a security in part because fashioning such a remedy in light of the purchaser-seller rule for monetary damages would require a grossly
249
strained reading of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Even if the Court holds that an exception to the purchaser-seller
rule exists for issuers seeking injunctive relief under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5, the Court is still left with the problem of manage246

741 F.2d 410 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Id. at 424 (citations omitted).
248
Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 733 n.5.
249
Cowin, 741 F.2d at 424 (“Attempting to fashion a different concept of standing
for cases [that concern injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5] would
involve us in distinctions altogether too awkward to be persuasive.”).
247
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ment using this exception for purposes of entrenchment.
Ultimately, the Court would likely have to adopt an exception to the exception, which would require an even more strained reading of sec251
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The Court may not be willing to stretch
so far beyond the words of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
The limitations in other express remedies in the 1934 Act also
suggest that the Court may be reluctant to grant an issuer standing
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Section 9(e) of the 1934 Act
provides a private right of action for “any person who shall purchase
or sell any security at a price” that was affected by a variety of manipu252
lative acts described in sections 9(a), (b), and (c) of the 1934 Act.
Section 18(a) of the 1934 Act provides a private right of action to
“any person . . . who . . . shall have purchased or sold a security”
based on “false or misleading” statements made in filings to the
253
SEC.
In both section 9(e) and section 18(a), standing is limited to
those individuals who have purchased or sold based on the allegedly
254
deceptive acts.
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 also afford relief to
individuals who have been victims of deceptive acts. The Court may
hold that an issuer or individual seeking injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 must also be a purchaser or a seller to be
255
consistent with other provisions of the 1934 Act.
The Supreme Court examined this argument in Blue Chip, but
failed to find it conclusive as to whether the purchaser-seller rule ap256
plied to actions for monetary damages.
The Court did state, how250

See supra Part IV.B (discussing possible misuse of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
by corporate directors for purposes of management entrenchment).
251
See supra Part IV.B.
252
15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (2000) (discussing persons liable in suits at law or in equity
for manipulation of security prices).
253
Id. § 78r(a) (discussing liability for misleading statements made in SEC filings).
254
The express rights of action in the 1933 Act are also limited to individuals or
entities purchasing or acquiring securities based on deceptive acts. See supra Part
II.A.
255
Notably, section 16(b) of the 1934 Act does provide a private right of action for
recovery of short-swing, insider profits “by the issuer, or by the owner of any security
of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to
bring such suit . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2000). However, this provision differs significantly from sections 9(e), 10(b), and 18(a) because section 16(b) is a strict liability cause of action, whereas sections 9(e), 10(b), and 18(a) require a manipulative or
deceptive act. Thus, a court is more likely to interpret the implied private right of
action under section 10(b) in a similar manner to sections 9(e) and 18(a).
256
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) (“[N]either
the congressional enactment nor the administrative regulations offer conclusive
guidance.”).
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ever, “[i]t would indeed be anomalous to impute to Congress an intention to expand the plaintiff class for a judicially implied cause of
action beyond the bounds it delineated for comparable express
257
causes of action.” When coupled with the Court’s adoption in Blue
Chip of the purchaser-seller rule for actions seeking monetary relief,
the limitations in other express remedies in the 1934 Act may be
enough for the Court to hold that the purchaser-seller rule also ap258
plies to actions for injunctive relief.
Finally, the wording of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 suggests
that the Court may be reluctant to hold that an issuer has standing to
seek injunctive relief without the purchase or sale of a security. As
stated previously, section 10(b) of the 1934 Act makes it unlawful for
any person to “use or employ, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or
any security not so registered . . . any manipulative or deceptive de259
vice or contrivance . . . .” To enforce section 10(b), the SEC prom260
ulgated Rule 10b-5. Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

261

The words “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security” suggest that there must be some actual link between the purchase or sale of a security and the alleged fraudulent conduct. The
Supreme Court may reject a more expansive construction of the “in
connection with” requirement and refuse to allow an issuer standing
to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without
the purchase or sale of a security. In fact, based on these grounds,
257

Id. at 736.
But see supra note 255 (discussing section 16(b) of the 1934 Act, which provides
a private right of action for issuers to recover short-swing, insider profits).
259
15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000).
260
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005).
261
Id.
258
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the Court may refuse to allow any individual standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without the purchase
262
or sale of a security.
Notably, after the purchaser-seller rule was announced in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp. and before it was adopted by the Supreme
Court in Blue Chip, Congress refused on two different occasions to
263
amend the jurisdictional reach of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
The lack of congressional action lends credibility to the argument
that Congress endorses the purchaser-seller requirement and does
not want an expansive class of plaintiffs with section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 claims.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although compelling policy justifications exist for allowing an issuer standing to seek injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 without the purchase or sale of a security, substantial obstacles
stand in the way of the Supreme Court holding that such standing exists. An exception to the purchaser-seller requirement is justified for
a corporate issuer seeking injunctive relief because of the nature of
injunctive relief, the injury to the issuer, and the role of the issuer as
best champion of its shareholders. However, the Court will likely
deny the existence of such standing because of the Supreme Court’s
aversion to broadening standing under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,
the possible misuse of issuer standing by directors and officers, and
interpretation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in the context of the
1933 Act and the 1934 Act.
The best solution may be for Congress to amend section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 to allow an issuer standing to seek injunctive relief
without the purchase or sale of a security. Based on previous attempts to amend the jurisdictional reach of section 10(b) and Rule
264
10b-5, however, Congress may be reluctant to alter either of these
provisions. Thus, how the judicial oak will grow remains uncertain.
262

See Cowin v. Bresler, 741 F.2d 410, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that no injunctive relief exception exists to the purchaser-seller rule, in part based on the statutory structure of the 1934 Act).
263
Id. (“Congress was asked on two different occasions to expand the jurisdictional reach of [section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5] but chose not to.”); Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 732 (1975) (“In 1957 and again in 1959, the Securities and Exchange Commission sought from Congress amendment of §10(b) to
change its wording from ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of any security’ to
‘in connection with the purchase or sale of, or any attempt to purchase or sell, any
security.’ . . . Neither change was adopted by Congress.”).
264
See supra note 263 and accompanying text.

